There is sufficient political will within NATO to end the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Fourteen, or half of all NATO member states actively support the end of TNW deployment while ten other countries say they would not block a consensus decision to remove the weapons. Only three NATO members (France, Hungary and Lithuania) say they oppose an end to the TNW deployment, and only France is willing to invest political capital to keep the weapons on the territory of Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and Turkey.Despite oft-repeated assumptions, there are no quick and easy formulae that accurately portray national positions. There is no clear relation between the duration of NATO membership and position on the TNW issue. The “new” NATO members are not more, or less, attached to the US weapons than the “old” members. Likewise, proximity to Russia is no explanatory variable. Perhaps not so surprisingly, the more active countries are in nuclear-sharing, the more vocal they are about wanting the weapons removed.The process of deciding the future of TNW deployment is currently at an impasse. The Strategic Concept dictates that NATO first needs to “aim to seek” Russian agreement on reciprocal steps towards a TNW free Europe. But Russia refuses to talk about its TNW until the US first relocates all its TNW back to the US. To break the impasse needs careful planning by multiple actors in multiple arenas. The alliance urges all member nations to strengthen NATO’s cohesion and refocus on its basic collective security function. Careful NATO management accentuated by profound analysis and debate should be fully exploited to avoid internal disputes over NATO’s nuclear stance.